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Abstract
Much has been written about why economists failed to predict the latest fi nancial and real 
crisis. Reading the recent literature, it seems that the crisis was so obvious that economists 
must have been blind when looking at data not to see it coming. In this paper, we analyze 
whether such claims are justifi ed by looking at one of the most cited and relevant variables in 
this analysis, the now infamous credit to GDP chart. We compare the conclusions reached 
in the literature after the crisis with the results that could have been drawn from an ex ante 
analysis. We show that, even though credit affects the business cycle in both the expansion 
and the recession phases, this effect is almost negligible and impossible to exploit from a 
policymaker’s point of view.
Keywords: business cycles, forecasting, fi nancial crisis.
JEL classifi cation: C22, E32.
Resumen
Se ha escrito mucho sobre por qué los economistas fallaron en la predicción de la última 
crisis real y fi nanciera. Leyendo la literatura actual, parece que la crisis era tan obvia que 
los economistas deben de haber estado ciegos cuando miraron a los datos para no ser 
capaces de predecirla. En este trabajo, analizamos si tales afi rmaciones están justifi cadas 
mirando al ahora «célebre» gráfi co del crédito sobre PIB. Comparamos las conclusiones que 
se alcanzan en la literatura después de la crisis con las que se podrían haber obtenido con 
un análisis ex ante. Mostramos que, aunque el crédito afecta el ciclo económico tanto en 
recesión como en expansión, este efecto es muy pequeño y, sobre todo, es imposible de 
explotar desde el punto de vista del análisis de política económica.
Palabras clave: ciclo económico, previsiones, crisis fi nanciera.
Códigos JEL: C22, E32.
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1 Introduction
Much has been written about why economists failed to predict the latest financial
and real crisis. From the press through specialized blogs to academic papers, ev-
erybody has highlighted the failure of the profession to foresee this crisis. As is
well known, even the Queen of England, when visiting the London School of Eco-
nomics in November 2008, asked why no one saw the credit crunch coming1. At
the same time, Paul Krugman, in the New York Times2, bemoans the profession is
blindness to the possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy. Finally, a
recent report, Colander et al (2009), written by scholars and quoted by numerous
bloggers, claims that it has been a misallocation of research efforts in economics,
and, in particular, an insistence on constructing models that disregard the key ele-
ments driving outcomes in the real-world markets that have been the main cause of
the inability of the economics profession to predict the current recession.
The recent downturn has also highlighted the lack of consensus in macroeco-
nomic thinking about how far the financial system influences economic activity.
Basic economic theory suggests that, in a frictionless world, the shocks originating
in credit markets play only a minor role in explaining business cycles. However,
the presence of financial imperfections can amplify their effect on the real economy
and, thus, disturbances in credit markets can lead to larger cyclical fluctuations in
the real economy. These frictions also provide micro-fundamentals for analyzing
the channels of transmission. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995); Bernanke et al.
(1999); and Kocherlakota (2000) are some of the earlier papers that model the dif-
ferent channels of transmission between the financial sector and the real economy.
However, as Krugman points out in his previously quoted article in the New York
Times, ”at the beginning of the recession, the impact of dysfunctional finance, had
not been at the core even of Keynesian economics”. In fact, the most influential
dynamic general equilibrium models developed just before the recession by Chis-
tiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouter (2007) do not incorporate any financial
accelerator mechanism. The debate at that time was about the effect of frictions,
nominal and real, and the role of monetary policy to offset these effects on output
and inflation. Although the financial accelerator mechanisms had been explored in
1Daily Telegraph, November 28th 2008
2Paul Krugman, New York Times Magazine, September 2nd 2009.
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the literature, other features of the data seemed more promising to explain busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, all the more so since these fluctuations were dramatically
reduced during the quiet times of the Great Moderation.
However, with the financial crisis, a newly flourishing literature has rekindled
interest in the topic of credit and business cycles. A broad and basically empiri-
cal body of literature, has looked back at history and focused on documenting the
timing of financial crises, establishing their typology and detecting the differences
between emerging and advanced economies. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) build
a massive database that encompasses the entire world across eight centuries, and
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010) provide data on the starting dates and charac-
teristics of systemic banking crises over the period 1970-2009, as well as a broad
coverage of crisis management policies. Both papers conclude that there are strong
similarities between recent and past crises and, consequently, the Great Recession
is nothing new.
In the wake of this work, and maintaining an empirical approach, another group
of studies attempts to explore the relationship between financial and macroeco-
nomic variables in greater depth. Following the seminal work of Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999), these papers pay special attention to the behavior of certain key
variables in the crisis environment, the similarities between the financial and the
real cycles and the ability of financial variables such as credit to predict recessions.
Schularick and Taylor (2009) construct a new historical database for 14 countries
over 140 years and show that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial
crises, suggesting that policymakers should pay more attention to credit. The same
database has been used by Jorda et al. (2011a, b) with different goals. Jorda et al.
(2001b) replicate the results of Schularick and Taylor (2009) and introduce external
imbalances, concluding that credit growth emerges as the single best predictor of
financial crises, and Jorda et al. (2011a) detect the turning points and look at the be-
havior of real and financial aggregates across business cycle episodes. Their results
highlight that credit booms tend to be followed by deeper recessions and sluggish
recoveries.
Among other authors who use a similar methodological approach, we can men-
tion Gourinchas and Obsfeld (2011), Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Claessens
et al. (2011b, c). Gourinchas and Obsfeld (2011) classify financial crises into dif-
ferent types by using several historical databases and analyze how key economic
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variables behave in the different categories of crises, estimating a logit panel to
assess their ability to predict crises. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) identify credit
booms with threshold values and analyze the performance of some macroeconomic
and financial variables around their peaks. Claessens et al. (2011a, b) provide a
comprehensive and quantitative characterization of financial crises by using a re-
peatable algorithm, instead of resorting to historical records, and conclude that they
tend to be long, severe and highly synchronized. The link between financial and
business cycles is addressed by Claessens et al.(2011c), who find that the duration
and amplitude of recessions and recoveries tend to be influenced by the strength
and intensity of financial crises. Finally, the International Monetary Fund (2009)
presents a compendium of most of these results3.
All these papers have much in common, both in the stylized facts derived from
them and in their methodological foundations. They provide considerable evidence
that financial markets, and credit in particular, play an important role in shaping the
economic cycle, in the probability of financial crises, in the intensity of recessions
and in the pace of recoveries. The argument is that the strong growth of domestic
credit and leverage that fuelled the expansion phase became the trigger for a finan-
cial crisis and, therefore, for a recession4. A common finding is that downturns
associated with financial crashes are deeper and their recoveries slower.
At this point, with the clarity and the robustness of previous results, it seems
surprising that the financial accelerator mechanism did not appear earlier on the
agenda of the theoretical business cycle models. It seems that the link between fi-
nancial and real crises is so obvious that economists should have been blind when
looking at data before the crisis to miss such an important feature of the data. Sig-
nificantly, however, all the papers that find this clear empirical evidence date from
after the financial crisis started. The question to ask now is whether this ex post
evidence, could be obtained ex-ante and if it is sufficiently robust to assist with
economic policy decisions.
From an econometric point of view, these papers employ a similar methodol-
ogy. Most of them consider that financial crises or recessions are known a priori,
3As a result of these empirical findings a growing literature is now seeking how to include richer
financial sectors into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (see, among others,
Christiano et al. 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011).
4Reinhart and Reinhart (2011) stress that this argument is especially important for the decade of
prosperity prior to the fall of 2008.
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either by using historical records or by pinpointing them with non-parametric tech-
niques. Crises are usually treated as isolated events, exogenous to the model, and
the behavior of some financial and macroeconomic variables is analyzed only near
to the turning points. Therefore, this research does not take into account the fact that
recession dating is uncertain in real time. Furthermore, when the macroeconomic
variables have the property of accumulating during the expansions periods, a poten-
tial bias may arise because these variables usually present high levels just before the
turning points. For example, from this literature, an analyst could extract the les-
son ”Credit to GDP growth is a particularly reliable indicator of recession when the
experiences of both advanced and emerging economies are considered together5”.
However, during long periods of expansions, credit to GDP growth is high and there
is no recession. Also, credit as a proportion of GDP accumulates over time endoge-
nously in different theoretical models, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) and Christiano et al. (2010), and, therefore, it is endogenously high
when expansions are long. Yet these high levels before turning points do not imply
any power of the credit to GDP ratio in predicting the turning points. In medical
terminology, the previous literature is more interested in the ”anatomy” of finan-
cial crises, after they have occurred, than in ”clinical medicine”, that is, diagnosis
from the symptoms. But both perspectives are necessary to practice good medicine.
Therefore, although these former papers have made a valuable contribution to our
understanding of the complex relationships between the real and the financial cy-
cles, we need to take a step further. For the lessons extracted from the data to be
of value to policymakers in their day-to-day policy decisions, we have to under-
stand the dynamics of these financial variables in real time without forgetting the
uncertainty about turning points.
The key point of our proposal is to consider the cyclical phases and, especially,
recessions in an environment of uncertainty. Policymakers that see credit to GDP
growing have to decide when the growth is dangerously high and could generate
a turning point. If a long expansion keeps generating a high credit to GDP ratio
endogenously, to cut credit dramatically could unnecessarily shorten the period of
healthy growth. Therefore, the key question for a policymaker is to what extent
the level of credit to GDP (or its variation) observed in period ”t” increases or
5Vin˜als (2012) quoting Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, September 2011
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not the probability of being in a recession in ”t + 1”, or whether it changes the
characteristics of future cyclical phases.
These are the questions that we try to answer in this paper. In order to do so,
we propose a novel and robust technique for dating and characterizing business
cycles and for analyzing the effect of financial and other types of variables. We
combine temporal and spatial data and we show that this approach is legitimate,
notably reduces the uncertainty associated with the estimation of recession phases
and improves forecasting ability in real time.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Credit build-up exerts a significant
and negative influence on economic growth, both in expansion and recession, in-
creasing the probability of remaining in recession and reducing that of continuing
in expansion. However, these effects, although significant, are almost negligible
on the business cycle characteristics. We show that there is no significant gain in
forecast performance as a consequence of introducing credit. Therefore, in con-
trast to the previous literature, our findings indicate that the role of credit in the
identification of the economic cycle and its characteristics is very limited.
Our results also explain why financial accelerator mechanisms have not played
a central role in the models that describe business fluctuations. The financial ac-
celerator was not a key point in explaining business fluctuations simply because,
empirically, it did not have such a close relationship to the business cycle, either in
a sample (prior to the crisis) or in an out of sample approach, once the uncertainty
in dating recession periods is included in the model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the results of the
previous literature. Section 3 describes the country model estimation, the different
steps for building the global model, and it appraises the forecast performance of the
global model with and without credit. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Credit and the business cycle. Explaining the past
Suppose that a policymaker has to decide whether to dramatically cut credit growth
in an economy or to let it continue to grow. Assuming that this policymaker likes
to make informed decisions, he/she will read the literature on the relation between
credit and growth and will probably reach the conclusion that credit to GDP growth
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is a particularly reliable indicator of recessions. As we mentioned before, this con-
clusion derives from the literature that supports the influence of financial variables
on the economic cycle. All these papers reach the same conclusion but using dif-
ferent transformations of the credit to GDP ratio, levels, variations or variations
divided by expansion durations. For example, Gourinchas and Obsfeld (2011) and
Kamisnky and Reinhart (1999), use the series in levels. Figure 1.a plots this se-
ries in levels for the US. As can be appreciated in the figure, it is a variable that
increases during expansion periods, as is predicted by the models that consider that
credit grows endogenously during booms. Another way to show, more formally, the
intuition that emerges from Figure 1.a can be derived from running the following
regression:
yt = α+β∗ t+ εt (1)
where yt is the credit to GDP ratio only in expansion periods, and t is a variable
that has a trend during each expansion period (using NBER dating) which starts
from 1 at the beginning of every new period. As shown in Table 1, the estimated
β coefficient for the US case is positive and significant, confirming what can be
seen in the figure. This is not only a characteristic of the US series from 1950.1
to 2011.2. We repeat this exercise with data for 39 OECD countries, using Bry
and Boschan (1971)’s algorithm to date expansions and recessions, and the results
are even clearer. The credit to GDP ratio has a significant trend during expansion
periods because the β coefficient is also positive and significant. Finally, the results
are the same when using the annual sample of Jorda et al. (2011a, b) from 1850
to 2008. Therefore, we can affirm that the credit to GDP ratio has a positive and
significant trend during times of expansion.
Trying to avoid this trending behavior, some other papers use the variation in
GDP (IMF 2009; Jorda et al. 2011b). However, as shown in Figure 1.b, this variable
still has a trend in the US. To test for this trending behavior, we do the same as we
did before with the ratio but, instead of the ratio, we use the variation in the ratio.
The results, for the US case, the 39 countries case and the Jorda et al. (2011a, b)
case are displayed in the second panel of Table 1. As can be seen, the β coefficient
is also positive and significant, showing that there is still a trend in this variable.
This is a standard result when one variable (credit) grows faster during times of
expansion times than the other (GDP), which seems to be a stylized fact in the data.
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Finally, some other papers construct different transformations of this ratio, the
most popular being credit intensity (Jorda et al. 2011b). This variable is defined as
the cumulative difference between credit growth and GDP growth normalized by
the duration of the expansion. It is plotted in Figure 1.c for the US. As in the two
previous cases, this variable has a significant trend. This trending behavior is cor-
roborated, as in the two previous cases, by carrying out the same regression analy-
sis, but with yt representing credit intensity. The results are shown in the third panel
of Table 1. Credit intensity still presents a positive and significant expansion-related
trend. We will now analyze the implications of the expansion-related trending be-
havior of the credit to GDP ratio (or its variations) on the standard econometric
approach used in the literature.
TABLE 1




variation in ratio 0.0087 2.6282
credit intensity 0.0147 2.2028
OECD 39 COUNTRIES
ratio 0.0530 17.0298
variation in ratio 0.0224 8.9129
credit intensity 0.0210 5.1895
JORDA ET AL. (2011)’S DATA
ratio 0.0030 6.2066
variation in ratio 0.0259 4.1160
credit intensity 0.0444 3.0135
Notes: We have estimated the regression yt = α+β∗ t+ εt where yt is the credit to GDP
ratio only in expansion periods, and t is a variable that has a trend during each expansion
period. In the cases of OECD data and Jorda et al. (2011)’s data, we have used the global
model.
All the papers that find a link between credit and the business cycle consider
crises, both their location and their typology, as exogenous variables. The econo-
metric methodology used in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011); Jorda et al. (2011a)
and Schularick and Taylor (2009) applies a panel logit model where the left-hand
side variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 several periods before the crisis and
is clearly explained by a set of macroeconomic variables, among which credit stands
out. In order to illustrate the econometric problems associated with this approach,
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we construct a variable that mimics the trending path of credit as follows. First, we
generate a variable with 0s and 1s following a random Markov chain with constant
transition probabilities using the 0.9 and 0.7 parameters for the transition proba-
bilities as estimated in Hamilton (1989). In this way, we generate a sequence of
”artificial recessions” completely impossible to forecast by definition (it is driven
by a random process with constant transition probabilities). In addition, we con-
struct a counter that accumulates during the expansion phase and decays linearly
during the recession phase until it returns to 1 at the beginning of the following
expansion, and we take logs of this accumulator to provide a shape similar to the
data in Figure 1.a6. We call this variable ”cumult” (See Figure 1.d). Finally, for
the artificial recession periods, we generate, in the spirit of Gourinchas and Obsfeld
(2011), a variable ”zt” which takes the value 1 if an artificial crisis occurs between
periods t + 1 and t + 3, and 0 otherwise. As they do, we estimate a logit model
relating ”zt” and ”cumult”. We repeat this exercise 1000 times for a series of 5000
observations. We find that the variable ”cumult” is significant at 5% in 83% of the
cases. The intuition of the result is clear. Even though, by construction, ”cumult”
does not have any predictive power on recessions, it is usually high at the end of
expansion periods. Therefore, spuriously, there is a significant ”predicting” behav-
ior at the end of the expansion, although, by construction, the number of periods in
which the economy is in artificial expansion” has no predictive power on the end of
the expansion.
Therefore, the apparent influence of credit could be due just to the build-up
behavior and we can get the same result with a random variable that contains no
more information about the business cycle than that derived from the accumulation
behavior which reproduces the typical ”boom and bust” of economic fluctuations.
This result shows that we can only obtain descriptive conclusions about the behav-
ior of credit without any possibility of obtaining inferences about future turning
points. However, the lesson that policymakers seem to obtain from this literature is
very policy-oriented: ”Credit to GDP growth is a particularly reliable indicator of
recession”. As a result, policymakers could feel that they have to cut credit dramat-
ically when it is high in order to prevent a not-forthcoming recession, but with this
decision they could shorten a healthy future expansion period.
6The results do not depend on the transformation of the accumulator. We use logs just to give a
nice shape that coincides with the shape of the credit to GDP ratio of Figure 1.a
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In addition to the previous problem associated with the trending behavior of the
credit to GDP ratio, another econometric issue in the previous literature needs some
further comments. As we mentioned, in this literature, crises, both their location
and their typology, are treated as exogenous variables. However, in the definition
of turning points, credit is one of the variables which is considered. A fall in credit
in period ”t, t + 1....t + k” contributes to the definition of a turning point in period
”t”. Given that the credit to GDP ratio and its variations (”creditt”) is a variable
that presents persistence, if we define the variable ”future recession in the next k
periods” as before, ”zt” and we run the regression:
zt = α+β∗ credit+ εt (2)
E(εt ,creditt) = 0, because ”zt” is defined looking at the evolution of ”creditt+1....t+k”
and, given that creditt presents autocorrelation, E(εt ,creditt) = 0 and, therefore, β
is upwardly-biased and no conclusions can be drawn from its estimation.
Finally, one basic accounting exercise should be considered when analyzing fi-
nancial and real crises. Even though financial and real crises are different events,
they dramatically coincided in the latest recession. The fact that the Great Reces-
sion was preceded by a build-up of domestic credit in most developed countries
could somehow bias our views about the relation between financial and real crises7.
In order to illustrate this point, we identify, for the sample of 39 OECD countries,
between 1950.1 and 2011.2, using the Bry-Boschan (1971) algorithm, 149 reces-
sion periods. Of these, only 45 coincide with one of the financial crises documented
by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011), and 31 of the 45 correspond to the recent cri-
sis. The others are mostly currency crises. Furthermore, for the sample that we
have, Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) identify 143 financial crises, of which only
45 correspond to a real crisis. Eliminating the last 31 recent crises, during the pe-
riod 1950.1 to 2011.2, for a sample of 39 countries, of the 230 financial or real
crises (143-31 financial, 149-31 real), we find that only 14 cases (6%) are both fi-
nancial and real. With this evidence in mind, it seems that to exploit the relation
between financial and real variables with the purpose of forecasting or preventing
future recession periods is definitively a long shot.
7Jorda et al. (2011a) make the point that excess credit is a problem in all business cycles not just
in financial crises.
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And this is our final goal. We want to provide policymakers with the appropriate
tools to make optimal policy decisions about allowing credit to grow or not. In order
to do that, we are going to analyze the forecasting power of the level of credit to
GDP (or its variation) observable in period ”t”, on both, the probability of being in
a recession in ”t+1” and the characteristics of this future recession period. We are
going to focus on inferring the future with the current information. But first, we
need a formal definition of turning point and a description of the characteristics of
the cycle.














(a) Credit to GDP ratio






















(b) Credit ratio variations










































(d) Artificial variable with build-up behavior
FIGURE 1. Trending expansion behavior of credit
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of reference is 1950.1 to 2011.2 for 39 OECD countries. Appendix 1 shows the
details of the countries, their acronym, the sample size of each series, the analysis
of the structural breaks and the level of coincidence between national and OECD
sources. Due to clear methodological changes in the data or samples that are too
short, we have had to discard six countries. Figure A1 (Appendix 1) plots the GDP
series for the 33 countries.
3.1 Dating turning points
Having defined the series of reference, we identify turning points with the non-
parametric framework of Bry and Boschan (1971) (BB). As is well known, this
algorithm provides a formal content to the graphical analysis of Burns and Mitchel
(1946). Although initially designed for monthly data, BB can be easily adapted for
quarterly data 8. We have considered a minimum cycle and phase length criterion,
restricting business cycles and phases to last at least 5 and 2 quarters, respectively.
The outcome of applying the BB procedure is displayed in Figure A1 (Appendix
1) for the thirty-three countries of our panel. Once the turning points have been
located, and following Harding and Pagan (2002), we dissect the business cycle
and calculate some outcomes such as the frequency of recessions, measured as the
number of months in recession over the total, and the mean duration, amplitude,
cumulation and excess of recessions and expansions. The frequency of recessions
is 0.14 on average, the mean duration of the recessions is 4.23 quarters and the mean
duration of the expansions 24.4 quarters. These results are plausible and agree with
the stylized fact that expansion periods are longer than recessions and are in line
with the durations estimated by the NBER for the US and the IMF (2009) for a
wide sample of advanced countries
8Our dating algorithm is based on Bry and Boschan (1971) and is an adaptation of Watson
(1994).We have also tried with the BBQ code of Harding and Pagan (2002) and obtain similar
results.
3 Credit and the business cycle. Inferring the future
We use GDP as the reference variable to analyze the business cycle. Our source is
the OECD database but we check for coincidence with national sources. Our sample
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3.2 Inferring the future without credit
3.2.1 Country model estimation
Even though the BB algorithm is a very popular method to date business cycle, it
has the inconvenience that it is mainly a descriptive method. Inferences can not be
made about future recession periods. The most popular alternative method that al-
lows us to date the cycle and to make inferences about future periods is the Markov
switching (MS) approach proposed by Hamilton (1989). The MS models charac-
terize the evolution of a variable through a process of conditioned mean to a state
of a specific nature. The changes in value in this dynamic process will allow us to
differentiate periods of expansion and contraction. Regime shifts are governed by
a stochastic and unobservable variable which follows a Markov chain. In general,
we consider the following process for the log growth of GDP9:
dytc = μSjc + εtc (3)
where dytc is the growth rate of GDP in country c, μSjc is the vector of Markov
switching intercepts and εtc/S jc ∼N(0, σ ). To complete the statistical specification,
it is standard to assume that these varying parameters depend on an unobservable
state variable S jc that evolves according to an irreducible m-state Markov process
where pi j controls the probability of a switch from state j to state i.
We have estimated a MS model with 2 states (i, j = 1,2) and a constant variance
for each country:
dytc = μ1c+ εtc for state 1
dytc = μ2c+ εtc for state 2 (4)
Assuming a classical cycle, μ1 and μ2 are associated with expansion and reces-
sion phases, respectively, and p11 = p and p22 = q represent the probability of being
in expansion/recession and staying in the same state.
The results of the estimation of MS models with a MLE algorithm are dis-
played in Table 2. We observe that μ1 and μ2 take average values of 1.16 and -1.87,
respectively. The mean probability of expansion and recession is 0.96 and 0.66, re-
9MS estimation requires stationarity. The application of a battery of unit root tests confirms the
result that GDP series are I(1) in log levels.
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spectively. However, and as happened in the BB case, the results show a significant
heterogeneity. Furthermore, the standard errors associated with the probability of
recession are usually high, which results in a great uncertainty about the duration
of recessions. In some cases, BG, FR, GR, IT, JP and PT, we obtain surprising
values. For instance, in the case of France, we find a growth cycle instead of a clas-
sical cycle. This is the consequence of two different trends in the evolution of the
growth rate10. Therefore, even though the MS model seems an appropriate tool to
define recession periods, there is a certain degree of uncertainty about the parameter
estimates when the sample is short and, consequently, there are few cycles. To in-
corporate credit into this type of system and to test the significance of the estimated
credit parameters always leads to accepting the null of non-significance because of
the low power of the test. For an accurate test, we will need a longer sample or to
incorporate Bayesian priors. This is the purpose of the following section.
TABLE 2
MS MODEL ESTIMATION
μ1 μ2 σ2 p q μ1 μ2 σ2 p q
AG 1.84 (0.21) −1.41 (0.40) 1.69 (0.33) 0.95 (0.02) 0.84 (0.08) IS 1.30 (0.15) −0.19 (0.27) 0.62 (0.15) 0.94 (0.03) 0.77 (0.13)
AU 0.95 (0.08) −0.33 (0.60) 1.12 (0.13) 0.98 (0.01) 0.60 (0.25) IT 1.64 (0.13) 0.28 (0.07 0.59 (0.07) 0.87 (0.05) 0.95 (0.01)
BD 0.70 (0.06) −2.96 (0.26) 1.00 (0.11) 0.98 (0.00) 0.23 (0.23) JP 2.26 (0.02) 0.57 (0.09 1.24 (0.13) 0.99 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00)
BG 1.17 (0.07) 0.33 (0.06) 0.24 (0.03) 0.91 (0.03) 0.94 (0.02) LX 1.20 (0.24) −2.26 (0.07) 2.69 (0.63) 0.95 (0.02) 0.46 (0.31)
BR 1.02 (0.18) −3.31 (0.79) 2.03 (0.40) 0.94 (0.02) 0.29 (0.24) MX 1.08 (0.07) −5.90 (0.61) 1.08 (0.11) 0.99 (0.01) 0.33 (0.27)
CL 1.57 (0.14) −1.11 (0.62) 1.55 (0.27) 0.96 (0.01) 0.55 (0.21) NL 0.69 (0.08) −2.43 (0.50) 0.75 (0.11) 0.96 (0.01) 0.19 (0.23)
CN 0.97 (0.06) −0.50 (0.31) 0.56 (0.06) 0.98 (0.00) 0.79 (0.10) OE 0.78 (0.06) −2.07 (0.52) 0.79 (0.08) 0.99 (0.00) 0.43 (0.26)
CZ 0.83 (0.14) −1.31 (1.00) 0.71 (0.15) 0.97 (0.00) 0.58 (0.33) PT 1.42 (0.07) 0.01 (0.09) 0.48 (0.06) 0.96 (0.01) 0.94 (0.02)
DK 0.52 (0.14) −1.51 (0.77) 1.32 (0.23) 0.98 (0.00) 0.71 (0.24) RS 1.59 (0.20) −3.06 (0.70) 1.10 (0.29) 0.97 (0.01) 0.69 (0.23)
EO 1.53 (0.20) −4.31 (0.87) 2.51 (0.47) 0.97 (0.00) 0.64 (0.20) SA 1.09 (0.09) −0.27 (0.22) 0.84 (0.11) 0.95 (0.02) 0.81 (0.07)
ES 0.91 (0.05) −0.04 (0.10) 0.21 (0.03) 0.97 (0.00) 0.91 (0.04) SD 0.73 (0.09) −3.59 (0.82) 1.48 (0.16) 0.99 (0.00) 0.25 (0.25)
FN 1.00 (0.10) −1.98 (0.40) 1.51 (0.18) 0.97 (0.00) 0.66 (0.14) SJ 0.96 (0.09) −4.80 (0.49) 0.47 (0.09) 0.98 (0.00) 0.49 (0.35)
FR 1.33 (0.08) 0.40 (0.07) 0.33 (0.04) 0.96 (0.01) 0.97 (0.00) SW 0.62 (0.07) −1.93 (0.54) 0.99 (0.10) 0.99 (0.01) 0.77 (0.18)
GR 2.18 (0.14) 0.32 (0.09) 0.88 (0.10) 0.93 (0.03) 0.97 (0.00) TK 1.44 (0.25) −5.43 (1.04) 2.81 (0.59) 0.95 (0.01) 0.43 (0.26)
HN 0.76 (0.07) −1.67 (0.28) 0.31 (0.06) 0.98 (0.00) 0.79 (0.16) UK 0.73 (0.07) −1.05 (0.36) 0.79 (0.09) 0.97 (0.00) 0.65 (0.15)
ID 1.40 (0.13) −8.08 (0.84) 1.42 (0.23) 0.99 (0.01) 0.49 (0.35) US 1.01 (0.07) −0.54 (0.29) 0.65 (0.07) 0.95 (0.01) 0.69 (0.11)
IR 1.19 (0.09) −1.56 (0.61) 1.43 (0.15) 0.99 (0.00) 0.86 (0.11) Mean 1.16 (0.11) −1.87 (0.48) 1.10 (0.17) 0.96 (0.01) 0.66 (0.17)
Notes: We have estimated a MS model with 2 states and a constant variance for each country where dytc = μ1+ εtc for state
1 and dytc = μ2+ εtc for state 2, dytc being the log rate growth of GDP. Standard errors in brackets.
10We have also estimated a MS-AR(1) model, obtaining similar results in most cases, although
in some countries the results of the two models differ significantly. We prefer to maintain the MS
specification because the residuals are not serially correlated for most countries. As Camacho and
Perez-Quiros (2007) show, the positive autocorrelation in GDP growth rates can be better captured
by shifts between business cycle states rather than by autoregressive coefficients.
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3.2.2 Global model estimation
Preliminary analysis When we estimate a time series model, linear or non linear,
we assume a constant distribution of the model for the whole sample. Obviously,
this is also the case when we estimate a MS model for each country. We assume
that the parameters, in particular the transition probabilities, which dominate the
business cycle characteristics, are constant for the whole sample. We assume this
even though, just looking at the Figure A1, we can see that there are major dif-
ferences between the different cycles within a country. For example, in the US,
the latest recession has different characteristics to the two previous ones, in terms
of amplitude, duration, etc. And these recessions have major differences with re-
spect to those before the Great Moderation. However, although major differences
in the time series and structural breaks have been documented, see McConnell and
Perez-Quiros, (2000) and Kim and Nelson (1999), we usually estimate models for
the whole sample understanding that we are estimating an ”average” pattern for the
economy with different realizations in different periods.
Nevertheless, even with these assumptions, we have shown the severe limita-
tions that the small number of cycles available for each economy provokes in our
estimates. One would like to be able to estimate an ”average” model for all the
economies where we could extract lessons based, not only on six or seven cycles
but on more than 100 complete cycles. That would imply having the same data
generating process for all the economies, with different realizations, which could
explain the differences observed across countries.
To check to what extent that assumption is plausible or at least, whether it is
no less plausible than the one that we make when estimating a time series in an
economy, we need to see if the time series heterogeneity within each country is
bigger than the heterogeneity across countries. To do so, in the same way that we
have a natural division of all the recessions and expansions of our dataset in 33
different countries, and we can calculate the characteristics of the business cycle in
each country, we divide the sample into 30 time intervals of equal duration and we
check the characteristics of the recessions and expansions that appear for all the 33
countries in each of those 30 intervals of 8 quarters’ duration11. For example, the
first interval represents the period 1950.1-1952.1 and we calculate the characteris-
11We use 30 intervals in order to be closer as possible of the number of countries.
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tics of the recessions during that period; interval 2 collects the recessions form the
next two years, and so on. In the end, we have distributed all the recessions that we
have in our sample into 30 intervals (or periods), but instead of being classified by
country, they are classified in a temporal fashion.
TABLE 3
KRUSKAL-WALLIS TEST

















Notes: p-values of the null hypothesis of equality across countries (grouping by countries) or
across periods (grouping by periods) in brackets; for periods the sample has been split into 30
groups.
In order to formally test the hypothesis that the differences by country are not
bigger than the differences in time, we use two statistical tests. First, we apply the
Kruskal-Wallis test (an extension of the rank sum Wilcoxon test for the multivariate
case) that compares samples from two or more groups and tests the null hypothesis
that all the samples are drawn from the same population. Notice that, when we
group recessions by countries, we test the null of equality across countries, and
when we group them by periods, we test the null of equality across periods. We
apply this test by countries and periods for the 4 characteristics of the recessions.
The results, displayed in Table 3, show that we accept that all the countries come
from the same population for all the characteristics at 5% significance, but we reject
that hypothesis in the time series dimension. For example, for duration, grouped by
country, we accept the null that all the countries are the same with a p-value of
0.61 but we reject the null of equal durations by periods with a p-value of 0.01.
In order to summarize the information of all the features of a recession, we have
calculated the Euclidean distance for each recession with respect to its country-
group (recessions in the same country) and its period-group (recessions in the same
period). The results are presented in Figure 2. The X axis represents each of the
recessions in our sample, and each of the two lines represents the Euclidean distance
to its country average and its period average (taking into account the 4 features that
we are considering). As can be seen, for most recessions the distance is lower and,
therefore, the similarity higher, to its period than to its country.
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In the X axis we display the different recessions. Black circles represent the distance of the characteristics of each crisis to its
period, and the white ones to its country.
FIGURE 2. Euclidean distance between business cycle characteristics by groups of
countries and periods
Second, we mix all the recessions and make clusters with similar characteristics.
We have selected four clusters based on the silhouette plot, which displays a mea-
sure of how similar each point is to points in its own cluster compared to points in
other neighboring clusters. After that, we analyze the concentration of periods and
countries in each cluster using the Herfhindal index. We find a greater concentra-
tion of periods than of countries for all the characteristics. So, it can be concluded
that there are more similarities in the same period than in the same country (Table
4).
Therefore, we can conclude that there is less heterogeneity across countries
than in a time series dimension. So, if, when we estimate a time series, we have
no problem in mixing heterogeneous features, it should not be a problem to build
a ”virtual country” that includes all the countries and periods of the sample. As
we mentioned above, our idea is that this strategy is feasible and will lead to a
significant reduction in the uncertainty of parameter estimates.
In order to mix the countries, we denote as dy jc the GDP growth of country c in
period t, Tc being its sample size. First, we construct the succession of growth rates
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TABLE 4
HERFHINDAL INDEX OF CLUSTERS
DURATION AMPLITUDE CUMULATION EXCESS MEAN
CLUSTER 1
By country 0.0657 0.0657 0.0527 0.0355 0.0571
By periods 0.0865 0.1142 0.0566 0.0383 0.0633
CLUSTER 2
By country 0.0359 0.0417 0.0495 0.0481 0.0483
By periods 0.0444 0.0445 0.0815 0.0872 0.0535
CLUSTER 3
By country 0.0741 0.0453 0.0430 0.0440 0.0741
By periods 0.1111 0.0453 0.1167 0.0440 0.1111
CLUSTER 4
By country 0.0492 0.0488 0.0384 0.0381 0.0363
By periods 0.0446 0.0446 0.0401 0.0394 0.0463
MEAN
By country 0.0479 0.0626 0.0693 0.0810 0.0488
By periods 0.0533 0.0671 0.1103 0.1885 0.0533
Notes: Higher numbers imply more concentration of countries or periods in each cluster; for
periods the sample has been split into 30 groups.
of all countries
dY = {dytc}t=1:Tc; c=1:n = {dy11, ...,dyT11, ...,dy1c, ...,dyTcc, ...,dy1n,...,dyTnn} (5)
where T = ∑nc=1Tc and n is the number of countries. After calculating the mean
and standard deviation of dY, we standardize each country and obtain
d˜Y = {dy˜tc}t=1:Tc; c=1:n = {dy˜11, ...,dy˜T11, ...,dy˜1c, ...,dy˜Tcc, ...,dy˜1n,...,dy˜Tnn} (6)
where {dy˜tc} = {dytc} with the mean and standard deviation of dY and construct
the series of our ”virtual country”, ˜Yr, as follows:
˜Y0 = 100
˜Yr = ˜Yr−1(1+dy˜tc/100), r = 1, ...T ; t = 1, ...Tc; c = 1...n (7)
Now, we explore the performance of the BB procedure when we use our ”virtual
country” (˜Y ) (that includes all the countries and periods and has a sample size of
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5,000, and we obtain 149 periods of recession. We show that the result of applying
the turning point algorithm to this ”virtual country” is almost the same as those of
estimating each country individually, but with small differences appearing in the
links between countries. We have also carried out a small experiment, randomly
drawing the order of the countries. We check the matching of turning points with
1,000 random orders of the countries and find that the error is less than 1%12.
Model estimation We estimate, as in the country model, a MS model with two
states as defined in (??) to our ”virtual country” (d˜Y ) as defined in (??). We ob-
tain results that are in line with the literature, with transition probabilities equal to
0.97 and 0.65 and expansion and recession means that are very close to the mean
of the country estimates. The parameter estimates are displayed in Table 513. It is
noteworthy that the standard errors associated with the probability of recession are
considerably lower than those obtained with the country specification. This model
also computes the probabilities of expansion and recession in every country and ev-
ery period of time. The data and probabilities of this global model are displayed in
Figure 3. Obviously, in this figure it is difficult to distinguish each country because
we are plotting 5000 observations corresponding to all the countries, one after the
other. However, if we compare these global probabilities, after retrieving them for
each country, with those obtained for the country model (CM), we find that the
correlation is very high in most countries with the exception of those with atypical
behavior (Table 6, first column). The conclusion is that we have “normalized” their
behavior by integrating it into something like a ”population of recessions”. This ar-
gument has a Bayesian interpretation because it is equivalent to introducing a prior
into the parameters of the countries. This prior correspond, for each country ”i”,
to the parameter distribution of the model estimated for all the countries excluding
country ”i”.
12Obviously the differences among each of the random orders come in the links between coun-
tries. Depending on the evolution of the next country, we will date a recession or not. However,
the links between two countries represent only 28 observations (30 countries minus two extremes)
which is approximately 0.5% of the observations.
13Given that we are aware of the problem of the link between each pair of countries on the dy-
namics of the global series, to test the robustness of the results, we have not considered the first
20 observations for each country in the maximization of the likelihood function. Additionally, we
have performed a stationary bootstrap, following the method of Politis and Romano (1994). In both
cases, the parameter estimates are very similar.
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TABLE 5
GLOBAL MODEL ESTIMATION












Notes: We have estimated a MS model with 2 states and a constant variance for the global model where
˜Yr = μ1 + εr for state 1 and ˜Yr = μ2 + εr for state 2, ˜Yr being the log rate growth of GDP of the ”virtual
country”. Standard errors in brackets.















In the top graph we display the observations of the ”virtual country” that consists in the
concatenation of the GDP growth rates (previously standardized) of all the countries;
the bottom graph displays the probability of being in recession with this global model
estimation.
FIGURE 3. Probability of recession with global model
Furthermore, we compare the turning points computed with the Bry Boschan al-
gorithm, that we use as the reference series, with the probabilities estimated for the
country model and the global model and find that the quadratic probability scores
(QPS)14 fall dramatically when we use our virtual-global country. On average, the
QPS of the difference between the recession indicator of the BB algorithm and that
estimated with the MS country model is 0.15 while, in the case of the MS estimated
for the virtual country, it is 0.08 (Table 6 column 2 and 3). The intuition of why
there is such a strong reduction in the QPS can be seen analyzing the case of France.
14To compute them, we use the definition of Quadratic Probability Score (QPS) of Diebold and
Rudebusch (1989), QPS = 1/T ∑Tt=1(Pt −BBt)2accuracy. This measure is similar to mean square
errors for the case of probabilities. When Pt refers to a forecast value, we denote it by FQPS
(Forecasting Quadratic Probability Score).




MS country-MS glob country prob global prob
AG 0.71 0.04 0.16
AU 0.95 0.08 0.08
BD 0.86 0.15 0.12
BG 0.40 0.38 0.03
BR 0.95 0.21 0.20
CL 1.00 0.04 0.04
CN 0.96 0.02 0.02
CZ 1.00 0.09 0.08
DK 0.97 0.19 0.19
EO 0.98 0.11 0.10
ES 0.71 0.11 0.03
FN 1.00 0.08 0.08
FR 0.35 0.44 0.02
GR 0.30 0.43 0.11
HN 0.96 0.10 0.08
ID 0.73 0.04 0.01
IR 0.93 0.06 0.06
IS 0.78 0.09 0.02
IT 0.24 0.50 0.12
JP 0.21 0.63 0.04
LX 0.98 0.08 0.09
MX 0.57 0.12 0.06
NL 0.95 0.09 0.08
OE 0.86 0.08 0.06
PT 0.57 0.21 0.04
RS 0.98 0.03 0.03
SA 0.77 0.05 0.09
SD 0.79 0.14 0.11
SJ 0.86 0.05 0.03
SW 0.89 0.11 0.09
TK 0.99 0.23 0.22
UK 0.99 0.08 0.09
US 0.95 0.04 0.05
TOTAL 0.79 0.15 0.08
Notes: QPS of the difference between BB states and MS prob-
abilities. Correlation between MS probabilities.
CM=country model; GM=global model
Figure 4, top panel, plots the recession probabilities obtained with the global model
and the recession probabilities obtained by estimating the country model for the
French economy. In addition, we plot the recession periods estimated using the BB
algorithm. As can be appreciated, the global model perfectly matches the BB turn-
ing points contrary to what happens with the country model recession probabilities.
The short sample and the characteristics of the French data make it very difficult for
the MS to obtain a proper convergence. In that sense, the priors that come from the
rest of the world help to fit the recession dates more properly. However, in the case
of US, (Figure 4, bottom panel) the difference is not so important and the country
and global model probabilities of recessions are highly correlated.
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The shadow areas correspond with the BB recession chronology; the gray line with the probability of being
in recession according to the country model; the black line according to the global model.
FIGURE 4. Comparing recession probabilities in France and USA
So, we have shown that we can mix countries and take advantage of a ”virtual
country” country with 5,000 observations. The estimation of recession probabilities
leads to similar results to those obtained with BB methods and so we have a power-
ful tool for analyzing recessions that allows us to make inferences about the future
and that dramatically reduces the uncertainty in the estimation of the parameters.
We are aware that, so far, we have ignored one of the most important features of
the international business cycle data. The well-known fact that there are important
co-movements in the economic time series across countries. Appendix 2 shows
how we have handled this issue. As we explain there, we explore two avenues:
First, we have introduced a new ingredient into our model, the dependence of each
country’s economy cycle on what happens in the rest of the world. Second, we have
incorporated co-movements across countries in a panel estimation. The first option
give us non-significant and wrongly-signed coefficients. The second, shows that the
danger of a possible misspecification of the nature of co-movements could lead to
a massive loss of fit in the model. Therefore, the GM proposed before stands as the
most robust framework to deal with all possible cross-dependence across countries.
Analyzing forecast performance This section provides a detailed analysis of the
forecasting ability of the model that we have carried out before introducing the fi-
nancial variables. Starting with an initial sample running from 1950.1 to 1969.4,
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we recursively increase the sample adding one more observation for each country in
every period until the last minus one period. Notice that, at each step, we construct
the global series with the countries that have information in this period and, con-
sequently, the quality of the data and the reliability of the results increase at each
step. This recursive exercise allows us to calculate the out-of-sample forecast one
period ahead in each iteration for each country. Calling Ptc the conditional proba-
bility at time t, of being in a recession, the probability of t+1 being in a recession is
Pt+1c = (1− pt)(1−Ptc)+qtP(tc) where p and q are re-calculated in each iteration
of the recursive algorithm.
To judge the true predictive efficacy of the model, it is interesting to compare the
forecast that we obtain estimating each country individually with the result of using
the global model. As our BB model represents the benchmark description of the
economy, we use the results of applying the BB algorithm and calculate the FQPS
and the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test for predictive ability (DM)15. Probabilities
of recession estimated with the global model match the BB states better than coun-
try estimates. The FQPS that compares the recession probabilities of the country
estimation with the BB turning points is significantly higher (around double) than
that obtained with the global model (0.29 and 0.14, respectively). Furthermore, the
results of the DM test show that this difference is significant when we compare the
country with the global model (the value of the statistic is 9.16 with a p-value of
0.000).
To sum up, we have built a global model that gathers all the information avail-
able about the crises at time t from different countries and different periods. We
have shown that this course of action is legitimate because we found more similari-
ties between recessions produced in the same period than in different periods in the
same country. We have shown the robustness of the model to different estimation
methods, especially parametric techniques, and the advantages that it offers in terms
of reducing uncertainty and increasing the ability to forecast. Furthermore, this ap-
proach considers the business cycle as an endogenous variable where recessions are
not punctual and exogenous facts as the literature normally assumes. In short, we
have obtained a tool that describes the dynamics of recession and expansions well,
and is able to infer future states of the economy based on the information of 149
15We have also applied the Giacomini and White (2006) test for conditional predictive ability
using a rolling procedure and the conclusions are similar.
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recession periods. Now, it is time to allow for the possibility of credit to modify
that framework, a matter that will be discussed in the next section.
3.3 Inferring the future with credit
The purpose of this section is to assess the effect of financial variables on the eco-
nomic cycle. We have selected credit as a reference variable and we have built the
ratio of domestic credit divided by nominal GDP in local currency (crti) for time
t and country i. This variable has been used in the most relevant empirical litera-
ture that studies financial crises [Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011); Rose and Spiegel
(2011) and Claessens et al. (2011b, c), among others]. Both the domestic credit se-
ries, defined as ”claims on private sector of depositary corporations”, and nominal
GDP have been collected from the International Monetary Fund (Financial Statis-
tics, IFS) and require some adjustment, such as removing seasonality (in nominal
GDP), matching exchange rates and homogenizing units 16. We present the results
of the analysis using the level of credit to GDP ratio as the previously quoted au-
thors do. We also estimate all the results with variation in credit to GDP ratio, and
in this case the key coefficient is not significant. This is why we present the results
of the levels, where the departure from the model without credit are clearer and
more significant17.
The final sample size of the domestic credit ratio is conditioned by the length
of the two series, especially that of nominal GDP, which is available for a shorter
sample for most countries. Therefore, to use the global model as a benchmark, we
need to reestimate the global model for the available sample, about 4,000 observa-
tions, obtaining similar results to those in the previous section18. In parallel, we
have built the global series for domestic credit, called CRt , where t=1, ...,T and T
is the global sample size, the sum of the number of observations for each country19.
16We have used the TRAMO-SEATS package (Gomez and Maravall, 1996) for the seasonal ad-
justment of the series.
17We estimate the model with and without standarizing the series of credit to GDP ratio to have
the same mean and variance for each country. The standardization of the series does not affect the
results. We present the results without the standarization.
18Details about the length of the domestic credit and nominal GDP series are presented in Ap-
pendix 1.
19For simplicity of the notation we are going to denote by ”t” the time-country index that we
denoted by ”r” in (??).
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3.3.1 In-sample analysis
Credit can affect the dynamics of the business cycle by modifying either the means
of the states, μ1 and μ2, or the transition probabilities, p and q.
The specification for the time-variant mean has the following expression:
d˜Yt = μst ,t + εt
μ1t = μ1+α1 ∗CRt−1 for state 1
μ2t = μ2+α2 ∗CRt−1 for state 2 (8)
The second specification corresponds to a time-variant transition probability
model (TVTP) with the following expression:
pt = p+δ1 ∗CRt−1
qt = q+δ2 ∗CRt−1 (9)
Notice that we include the credit ratio with a lag in order to use this information
for forecasting at time t. Table 7 summarizes the results of estimating the baseline
model, without introducing credit, the model with time-varying state means, the
model with time-varying transition probabilities and the model that includes both
time-varying means and probabilities20. The effect of credit on the means of states,
measured by α̂1 for expansions and by α̂2 for recessions, is negative and significant
in both cases (-0.37 and -0.50, respectively). This means that an increase in the
credit ratio reduces the growth in expansions and increases the fall in recessions. A
similar picture is obtained when we study the influence of credit on the transition
probabilities, p and q. We find a negative but small and not significant effect on
the probability of being in expansion, and a positive and significant effect on the
probability of being in recession. This result implies that the higher the credit to
GDP ratio, the longer the expected duration of the recession period. We do not
consider the model that includes the credit to GDP ratio affecting both the mean of
the states and the probabilities because, as can be seen in Table 7, fourth line, the
20The estimated coefficients for the model without credit appear in the first row of the Table 7
and change marginally with respect to those displayed in Table 5, due to the reduction of the sample
after the introduction of the credit.
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TABLE 7
GLOBAL MODEL ESTIMATION WITH CREDIT
μ1 μ2 σ2 p q δ1 δ2 α1 α2 θ
























































































































Notes: We have estimated a time-varying transition probability (TVTP) Markow switching model where pt = p+δ1 ∗CRt−1
and qt = q+ δ1 ∗CRt−1 where CR is the ratio of credit to GDP and a model where CR affects the means of the two states,
μ1t = μ1 +α1 ∗CRt−1 and μ2t = μ2 +α2 ∗CRt−1. In addition, a duration-dependence model has been estimated, where θ
means the effect of the duration of the current recession. Standard errors in brackets.
coefficient of the time-variant probability parameters have the wrong sign, making
it clear that the model presents specification problems. In terms of the in-sample
analysis, the results of fitting the recession periods show that the inclusion of the
financial variable leaves unaffected the average QPS.
Additionally, as we mentioned before, we are interested, not only in inferring
future probabilities, but also in understanding the effects of credit on business cycle
characteristics. So, we have calculated the duration, amplitude and cumulation for
the two cyclical phases and the three models considered: the baseline without credit,
the model that considers means of states depending on credit and the model that
allows the probabilities to vary over time depending on the evolution of credit. For
time-varying parameters, we define the duration (D), amplitude (A) and cumulation
(C) of recessions as follows21.
If μ2 is time-varying, the expected growth in recessions will be a weighted av-
erage of the growth in each period of time, where the weights are defined by the
probability of being in a recession in each period t,
21Notice that, in a MS model, the excess is equal to zero.










Given that the transition probabilities are constant, the formula for duration is
the standard one, E(D) = 1/(1− q). Therefore, the amplitude and the cumulation
will be just
E(A) = E(μ2)/(1−q)
E(C) = E(μ2)/2∗ (1−q)2 (10)
If q is time-varying, the expected duration will be a weighted average of the









P(rect), where dt = 1/(1−qt)
E(A) = μ2E(D)
E(C) = μ2(E(D))2/2 (11)
where P(rect) is the probability of being in recession at each time t in country c.
In fact, the figures of the three features are very similar for all the models.
In the case of recessions, the introduction of credit into the means of states has a
positive but small influence on recessions and a negative but also small effect on the
transition probabilities. Similar conclusions are obtained in the case of expansions
(see Table 8).
But it is convenient to clarify that the above results reflect the average behavior.
If we look at the effect over the whole range of values of credit and focus on the
extreme values, we conclude that, perhaps, on average the effect of credit is small,
but it could have important effects on the extreme values. Figure 5 shows the evo-
lution of the effect of the credit ratio on business cycle features in both the mean
time-varying and probability time-varying models. In the first case, when credit
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TABLE 8
EFFECT OF CREDIT ON BUSINESS CYCLE FEATURES
MODEL DURATION AMPLITUDE CUMULATION
RECESSION
MS Model with fixed means and probabilities 2.50 −4.61 −5.77
MS Model with fixed probabilities and time-varying means 2.49 −4.41 −5.50
MS Model with fixed means and time-varying probabilities 2.55 −4.70 −5.99
MS Model with duration dependence 2.78 −5.03 −6.99
MS Model with duration dependence and time-varying means 2.83 −4.92 −6.99
EXPANSION
MS Model with fixed means and probabilities 35.26 30.60 539.54
MS Model with fixed probabilities and time-varying means 33.16 28.96 480.14
MS Model with fixed means and time-varying probabilities 34.88 30.29 528.18
MS Model with duration dependence 36.62 31.81 582.51
MS Model with duration dependence and time-varying means 35.19 24.71 434.89
Notes: Duration in quarters.
reaches maximum values above 2, the amplitude of the recession is -6.7, which is
an almost 50% increase over the average value of -4.5. Similarly, the duration may
be up to 4.5 quarter when credit has extreme values, compared to the 2.5 that the
average values recorded. Notice that, in this case, the path is exponential due to the
non-linear relationship between probability and duration.





































The top graph displays the path of amplitude according to the time-variant mean model;
the bottom graph the path of duration according to the time-variant probability model.
FIGURE 5. Effect of credit on extreme values
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Therefore, this section reconciles our results with the standard results in the
recent literature. It seems that credit affects probability of being in recession. Credit
to GDP ratio is a significant variable in both the specification of the mean and
transition probabilities. We show that credit matters even in a context where the
recessions periods are not exogenously given. But, if the relation between credit
and forthcoming recessions is so clear, the question asked by the Queen of England
is completely relevant. Why did nobody see the recession coming?
3.3.2 Out-of-sample
To see the recession coming implies being able to forecast future economic de-
velopments in t + k with the information available in period t. Given the previous
results, the natural candidate to use as an indicator of what is coming is the credit
to GDP ratio. The main goal of this section is to assess up to what point, there is
a marginal gain in the forecasting ability of the models that include the credit to
GDP ratio versus the models that do not take credit into account. More specifically,
we analyze the ability to forecast both the probability of entering into recession and
the business cycle characteristics of the global model (GM); the global model that
considers time-varying means depending on the credit rate (GM credit μ); and the
global model that considers time-varying transition probabilities depending on the
credit rate (GM credit prob). As usual, we consider the BB model as our bench-
mark model. We have also carried out the analysis for the country model, but this
model performs very badly in comparison with the different global models and, so,
we have not included the results in the tables22.
We have followed a similar procedure to that described in previous sections, re-
cursively estimating the model with an initial sample running from 1950.1 to 1969.4
and calculating, in each iteration, the probability of recession at time t+1 with in-
formation at time t and the features of the recession with the parameters estimated
at time t. The main conclusion is that there are no important differences between
the forecasting ability of the global models. The first row of Table 9 shows this
lack of differences using the Forecasted QPS (FQPS). More formally, the Diebold
and Mariano (1995) test, shows that neither the model with probability that consid-
22To avoid the inclusion of more tables, there are two more models in the comparison that we will
introduce later in the text but they already appear in the table. We will talk about these models later.
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ers time-varying means depending on the credit rate (GM credit μ); nor the global
model that considers time-varying transition probabilities depending on the credit
rate (GM credit prob) improve the results of the GM model. The results are dis-
played in the first two squares of Figure 6. Each block presents the FQPS of the
model in the row, the FQPS of the model in the column and the results of the
Diebold and Mariano test of equal values. As can be seen, the GM model is not
worse than any of the two candidates, the (GM credit μ) and the GM credit prob)
models. The second one presents even significantly higher FQPS than the GM
model23.
TABLE 9
FORECASTING BUSINESS CYCLE CHARACTERISTICS
GM GM credit μ GM credit prob GM dd GM dd credit μ
FQPS 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
FQPS at turning points (1,2.period, total) 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43
MSE duration recessions at first point 9.84 10.36 11.14 8.74 9.23
MSE amplitude recessions at first point 20.47 22.60 21.47 19.52 20.69
MSE cumulation recessions at first point 494.14 505.78 511.65 473.72 482.92
Notes: FQPS of the difference between BB states and MS forecast probabilities. MSE of the difference
between BB characteristics and MS forecast characteristics.
This impression does not change when we consider the effect of credit on the
forecasting of business cycle characteristics. We have extracted the observations
corresponding to recessions from the global series, following the BB chronology,
and we have studied several indicators, which are shown in Table 9. The follow-
ing rows of this table display the results of forecasting recession features at the
beginning of the recession. For all the characteristics, duration, amplitude and cu-
mulation, the GM presents smaller forecasted MSE when comparing the forecast
made by the three models on the first quarter of recession period and the realization
of the characteristics in those recessions. So, the inclusion of the credit ratio has no
significant effects on forecasting recession characteristics.
In short, even though we saw before that, in-sample, there was a relation be-
tween credit and recessions, there is no way to exploit this relation in an out of
23We repeat the exercise concentrating on the predictive power of the different models on the
first two periods of the turning points. The GM presents similar FQPS to the GM credit μ and the
GM credit prob models.
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nor forecast the characteristics of forthcoming recession with this variable24.
But then, why are the in-sample results so clear and the out of sample results,
which are the ones that are needed to infer the future, so poor? The following
exercise could shed some light on this.
3.3.3 In-sample analysis. 2008.3
We now repeat the previous in-sample analysis but just at the beginning of the Great
recession. The first quarter of the recession period, according to the NBER, is, for
the US 2008.1. According to the CEPR, for the Euro Area, it is 2008.2. The rest of
the countries also start the recession around those dates. With these dates in mind,
we estimate, for 2008.3, the first quarter in which most of the countries are in reces-
sion, the models that have focused our analysis in the previous section, the model
with time-varying state means and the model with time-varying transition proba-
bilities. We choose this date because it coincides exactly with the available sample
when the Queen of England formulated her question. The results are displayed in
rows five and six of Table 7.
As can be seen in the table, one of the coefficients for the time-varying state
means model has the opposite sign to the expected one (+0.35) indicating that more
credit implies less negative growth rates in recession periods. The model with
time-varying probabilities gives non-significant results for the coefficients δ1 and
δ2.Therefore, the evidence that links credit and recessions, even though it is clear
with the latest available information, was not clear before the Great Recession. The
in-sample results for the sample until 2011 are basically driven by the coincidence,
in the latest recession, of a financial and real crisis in most of the countries in our
sample. But this evidence was not present in the data when the Queen asked her
question. This is why nobody saw what was coming. This is also why the results of
the out of sample analysis show the impossibility of exploiting the relation between
credit and growth to make inference about the future.
24We understand that not all crises have a financial origin and that may bias our results towards not
finding significant effects of credit. To confirm this hypothesis, we repeat the forecasting exercise
using only those recessions (selected with the BB algorithm) that coincide with the financial crises
documented in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011). Our results show that the forecasting performance
of the different models is very similar, because we reach the same conclusion. Credit does not help
to forecast recessions that have a financial nature.
sample experiment and, therefore, a policymaker can neither improve the inference
about the state of the economy in t+1 with the information about credit in period t
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3.3.4 Duration dependence
The fact that the out of sample results are so disappointing made us think that,
perhaps, it is just impossible to improve the results of the GM. It might be that
the uncertainty associated with recessions is so high that the null hypothesis of no
improvements will always be accepted for all the dimensions in which we try to
extend the GM.
In order to test this, we introduce a new ingredient into our global model in or-
der to gauge the robustness of the effect of credit. So far we have considered that the
duration of the recession is fixed. However, it is plausible to think that its expected
duration may depend on how long the country has been in recession. This idea was
introduced by Diebold and Rudebusch (1990) and developed in the MS framework
by Durland and McCurdy (1994) and Filardo and Gordon (1998) who extend the
model of Hamilton (1989) to allow state transition to be duration-dependent. More
specifically, we only consider the effect of previous duration in the transition prob-
ability of recessions25. So, the expression of the probability of staying in recession
is qt = q+ θ∑di=1P(rect−i). We have considered a maximum value of d=8, based
on the results obtained with the BB method.26 We have also combined the mean
time-varying model depending on credit with the duration-dependence probability
of being in recession 27. The results of estimating the two models appear in lines
7 and 8 of Table 7. We can see that the parameter of duration dependence is nega-
tive and significant, which means that, as we expected, the probability of being in
recession decreases, the longer the recession has lasted. Although the value of the
parameter is small, -0.09, notice that its effect increases as the recession progresses
so that, when a country has spent 2 quarters in recession, the probability decreases
by 0.18, when it has spent 3 by 0.27 and so on up to 0.7, which reduces the prob-
ability to zero. The introduction of the credit variable into the means of the states
barely changes the value and significance of the duration-dependence parameter.
Furthermore, the parameters corresponding to time-varying means are similar to
those of the previous model, which shows the robustness of the estimation.
25We are especially interested in recessions. Furthermore, the duration-dependence parameter is
not significant for expansions.
26The histogram of duration shows that most values are concentrated in the interval 2-6, the mean
duration is 4 and only a few values higher than 8 can be found.
27The results of mixing duration-dependent probability models and time-varying transition prob-
abilities with credit imply specification problems and not stable solutions.
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What is interesting about this specification is the out of sample performance.
The results of the analysis are displayed in the last two columns of Table 9 and the
two-by-two formal statistical comparisons with the rest of the model is presented
in Figure 6. The model that only contains the duration dependence is denoted by
GM dd. The model that contains duration-dependence and mean time-varying de-
pending on credit is denoted by GM dd credit μ. As can be seen, the GM model is
clearly outperformed by GM dd which is also better than GM dd credit μ (although
not significantly). Therefore, the GM forecasting performance can be statistically
improved, but not in the direction of including credit.
FIGURE 6.Comparing forecasting of probability of recessions (Diebold and
Mariano test)
This good out of sample performance of the GM dd model also extends to the
forecasting of the business cycle characteristics. For amplitude, duration and cu-
mulation, GM dd is, again, significantly the best. So, the conclusion is that the
GM dd model is the best of the global models in terms of forecasting and leads
to significant improvements with respect to GM. Summing up, the conclusion of
the out-of-sample analysis is that the credit ratio does not play a role in forecast-
ing either the probability of recessions or their characteristics. Both the descriptive
analysis and the posterior statistical analysis have shown that, the model that takes
GM GM_credit_P GM_credit_prob GM_dd GM_dd_credit_P
FQPS1=0.1110 FQPS1=0.1110 FQPS1=0.1110 FQPS1=0.1110
GM FQPS2=0.1140 FQPS2=0.1168 FQPS2=0.1058 FQPS2=0.1068
DM_test=Ͳ1.4507(0.2786) DM_test=Ͳ2.6116(0.0264) DM_test=3.7780(0.0006) DM_test=2.1192(0.0845)
FQPS1=0.1140 FQPS1=0.1140 FQPS1=0.1140
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dependence duration into account in the probability of recessions is the best in all
cases, beating the rest of the models.
Finally, according to the IMF (2011) report, even though variation in the credit
to GDP ratio is a good indicator of recession, when this variable is combined with
asset prices, the results are more robust. We have checked the interaction effect of
credit with other variables such as stock returns and housing prices on the proba-
bility of recession and expansion. We have introduced the variables in three ways.
First, we incorporate credit and one additional variable in the same model. Second,
we include the product of credit and each of the other two variables. Finally, we
consider credit only when the value of stock returns or housing prices is above a
threshold value (quantile 75 or 90). In no case, do we find any important effect that
increases the significance of credit.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze why economist failed to forecast the Great Recession. We
illustrate this failure looking at one of the most cited and relevant variables in this
analysis, the now infamous credit to GDP chart. We find that credit build-up ex-
erts a significant and negative influence on economic growth, both in expansion and
recession, increases the probability of remaining in recession and reduces that of
continuing in expansion. However, these effects, are mainly driven by the latest re-
cession. The comparison of the forecast performance of models that include credit
with other global models show that there is no significant gain as a consequence of
introducing credit. Therefore, in contrast to previous literature, our results indicate
that the role of credit in the identification of the economic cycle and its characteris-
tics is very limited.
Our results explain why financial accelerator mechanisms have not played a
central role in models to describe business fluctuations. The financial accelerator
was not a key point in explaining business fluctuations because empirically it did
not have such a close relation with the business cycle, both in sample (previous to
the crisis) and in an out of sample approach, once the uncertainty in dating recession
periods is included in the model. So, with the full sample, credit can describe the
past but not infer the future.
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Appendix 1. The data (For Online Publication)
TABLE A.1
GDP DATA


























Russian Federation RS 2003.1−2011.2





United Kingdom UK 1955.1−2011.2
United States US 1950.1−2011.2
Notes: sources, OECD, Datastream and National Statistics Institutions. The series employed is the Gross Domestic
Product, expenditure approach, volume estimates in millions of national currency, quarterly and seasonally adjusted.
A careful analysis of methodological coherence has been carried out. We have proceeded as follows. First, we estimate
an autoregressive equation AR(1) for each series and carry out the Quandt-Andrews stability test, both on the constant
and the autoregressive parameter, identifying the position of the most likely break data and estimating its significance.
Second, we estimate ARCHmodels and analyze the path of the conditional variance. Finally, when we identify significant
breaks coinciding with methodological changes, we keep only those that show a match between national sources and the
OECD database. For some countries the sample size is too short to make inference or detect properly turning points and
have been removed. These countries are IC, KO, NO, NZ, PQ and SX.
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TABLE A.2
CREDIT DATA
COUNTRY ACRONYM DOMESTIC CREDIT Nominal GDP
Argentina AG 1960.4−2011.3 1993.1−2011.2
Australia AU 1957.1−2011.3 1959.3−2011.2
Germany BD 1970.1−2011.2 1960.1−2011.2
Belgium BG 1970.1−2011.2 1980.1−2011.2
Brazil BR 1959.4−2011.2 1990.1−2011.2
Chile CL 1967.1−2011.2 1996.1−2011.2
Canada CN 1957.1−2008.4 1957.1−2011.2
Czech Republic CZ 1993.1−2011.3 1993.1−2011.2
Denmark DK 1970.1−2011.3 1977.1−2011.2
Estonia EO 1991.4−2010.4 1993.1−2011.2
Spain ES 1972.1−2011.2 1970.1−2011.2
Finland FN 1970.1−2011.2 1970.1−2011.2
France FR 1970.1−2011.2 1965.1−2011.2
Greece GR 1970.1−2011.2 2000.1−2011.2
Hungary HN 1982.4−2011.2 1995.1−2011.2
Indonesia ID 1968.1−2011.3 1990.1−2011.2
Ireland IR 1970.1−2011.2 1997.1−2011.2
Israel IS 1957.1−2011.3 1971.1−2011.2
Italy IT 1970.1−2011.3 1960.1−2011.2
Japan JP 1957.1−2011.2 1957.1−2011.2
Luxembourg LX 1970.1−2011.3 1999.1−2011.2
Mexico MX 1957.1−2011.3 1981.1−2011.2
Netherlands NL 1970.1−2011.3 1977.1−2011.2
Austria OE 1970.1−2011.3 1964.1−2011.2
Portugal PT 1970.1−2011.3 1977.1−2011.2
Russian Federation RS 1993.4−2011.3 1994.1−2011.2
South Africa SA 1971.2−2011.2 1960.1−2011.2
Sweden SD 1969.4−2011.3 1980.1−2011.2
Slovenia SJ 1991.4−2011.3 1995.1−2011.2
Switzerland SW 1957.1−2011.2 1970.1−2011.2
Turkey TK 1959.2−2011.2 1987.1−2011.2
United Kingdom UK 1959.1−2011.3 1957.1−2011.2
United States US 1957.1−2011.3 1957.1−2011.2
Notes: sources, International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, IFS.
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Appendix 2. Capturing co-movements across countries
(For Online Publication)
In order to properly address the presence of co-movements in the global model we
have pursued several avenues. First, we have introduced a new ingredient into our
model: the dependence of each country’s economic cycle on what happens in the
rest of the world (Wt). To do that, we follow a two-step process. In the first step,
we estimate the global model and, with this estimation, we construct the probability
of recession in the world by averaging in every period of the country probabilities
obtained from this global model (for every period we have 30 countries). Second,
we enlarge the global model by introducing the probability of being in a recession in
the world in a time-varying transition probability (TVTP) Markov switching model
(Filardo 1994), where pt = p+δ1Wt and qt = q+δ2Wt .
The results show that the probability of a recession in the world economy has
a negative influence on p and a positive one on q, and is significant in both cases.
That is, the probability of remaining in expansion decreases, and that of being in
recession increases, when the rest of the world is in recession28. Even though the
coefficients are significant, qualitatively they are not very different from the global
model that does not contain the world economy. The correlation between the prob-
abilities of recession in these two specifications is 0.96. An additional drawback of
this specification is that we are contemporaneously including the world economy
and, consequently, the model has a limited forecasting ability. In order to address
this point, we estimate a model that contains the state of the economy in the world
in period t −1 obtaining non-significant and wrongly-signed coefficients. It seems
that the possibilities of introducing comovements with this approach are limited.
But we are aware that co-movements between countries might act in other ways.
In order to properly address the effect of co-movements in the model, we need to
study the effect of cross-correlations between countries in the estimated parameters.
If the effect is important, a multivariate estimation or a panel estimation that takes
cross-correlation into account would be more suitable. But co-movements might
be linear or non linear and disentangling the source of co-movements might have
28We have refined this estimation with an iterative process after we estimate the second step. The
iteration consists of re-estimating the model using the probabilities obtained in the second step as
Wt and keep redoing the estimation until we reach convergence in Wt .
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important implications in the estimation of the model. Although a proper analysis
in a general specification lies outside the objectives of this paper, the nature of the
results can be obtained from the following simulation exercise. Suppose that two
countries have the following data generating processes (DGP):
country 1: y1t = μs1t + ε1t ; ε1t = ut +ζ1t
country 2: y2t = μs2t + ε2t ; ε2t = ρut +ζ2t (12)
where sitrepresents the state at time t of country i that is driven by a transition matrix
with probability p, q29, for expansions and recessions, respectively. Notice that both
countries have a common shock, ut , which is correlated between the two countries,
and an idiosyncratic shock, and both are assumed to be mutually independent, zero-
mean i.i.d. processes. As can be seen, these countries co-move because they have
a source of linear co-movements, the shock ut which is common to both countries.
But in addition to this source of co-movements, the countries could move together
because their non linear component is also common. So, we now generate three
types of series depending on whether the two countries share the state, do not share
it, or do so partially :
1. share states: s1t = s2t ∀ t
2. do not share states: s1t independent of s2t
3. share states partially: s1t = s2t ∀ t=1:T/2 and s1t independent of s2t ∀ t=T/2+1:T
where T is the number of simulated observations.
We have estimated the three types of series with four different methods: a) indi-
vidually country by country with a univariate MS model; b) jointly with a univariate
MS model as in the ”global model” explained before; c) with a bivariate model as
if both countries share states (just one MS model describes the behavior of both
countries); and, finally, d) with a bivariate model as if both countries do not share
states (two hidden independent Markov processes). Results in Table A2 show that,
when the countries share states, the univariate model both individually or jointly,
29We assume that the p and q are the same for both countries in order to relate our results with
the previous evidence that there are not such great differences across countries.
performs similarly, and the improvement is small when we apply a bivariate esti-
mation assuming the correct DGP (model c). However, if we use a bivariate model
that supposes that countries do not share states (model d), the results worsen dra-
matically. The intuition is that the model d captures the non linear co-movement in
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the linear co-movements, implying a bias in the estimation coefficient that reduces
the good fit of the dynamics of the MS process. Analogously, if the process does
not share states, the univariate model estimates the parameters accurately and there
is no important difference with respect to the bivariate model that estimates the two
countries separately (model d) while it improves dramatically with respect to the
model that, misleadingly, considers that the two countries share the non linear pro-
cess (model c). Models a and b are robust to possible mispecifications of the degree
of common non linearity. It is also important to note that models a and b perform
similarly because the improvement from estimating the global model comes from
the huge increase in the number of observations. Here we are considering only two
countries, therefore, the increase in the number of observations is very limited. Fi-
nally, if the countries partially share states, we obtain intermediate results and the
same conclusion. To sum up, the bivariate model works very well if we know the
true characteristics of the data or if we establish them correctly in our Bayesian pri-
ors, but the univariate model yields very similar results even without knowing the
true DGP. Finally, the degree of cross-correlation does not have a very important
influence although the estimation problems are greater, the greater the value of ρ.
From this exercise, we can conclude that, even though the topic requires more
research to generalize the results to N countries the gains from estimating a mul-
tivariate model are, at first sight, very limited. In general, the possible misspeci-
fication of the multivariate model, in the absence of proper priors, could lead to a
massive loss of fit in the model. The results of the ”global model” proposed before
are more robust to this kind of misspecifications.
Notes: QPS of the difference between BB states and MS probabilities.
TABLE A2
ANALYSIS OF CROSS-CORRELATIONS
ρ 0.1 0.5 0.9
DGP: SHARE STATES
Univariate MS, two countries separately 0.0853 0.0933 0.1123
Univariate MS, two countries jointly 0.0798 0.0877 0.1044
Bivariate MS, supposing that they share states 0.0455 0.0703 0.0886
Bivariate MS, supposing that they do not share states 0.1325 0.2101 0.2365
DGP: DO NOT SHARE STATES
Univariate MS, two countries separately 0.0843 0.0935 0.1117
Univariate MS, two countries jointly 0.0795 0.0868 0.1020
Bivariate MS, supposing that they share states 0.2171 0.2312 0.2353
Bivariate MS, supposing that they do not share states 0.0826 0.0801 0.0760
DGP: SHARE STATES PARTIALLY
Univariate MS, two countries separately 0.1502 0.1528 0.1506
Univariate MS, two countries jointly 0.1446 0.1469 0.1533
Bivariate MS, supposing that they share states 0.1310 0.1547 0.1693
Bivariate MS, supposing that they do not share states 0.0888 0.1035 0.1129
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